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TRADING QUALITY FOR QUANTITY*
CHRISTOPHER KNAPP
Binghamton University
1. Some philosophical problems are decidedly esoteric. One could be forgiven for
thinking that certain counterexamples Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels have
offered to the transitivity of the better-than relation are prime instances. For the
most compelling of these putative counterexamples rely on our evaluative
judgments concerning the quality of hypothetical lives that last an incredibly long
time. And if the phenomena the counterexamples purport to uncover emerge only
when we evaluate lives that last, say, 1050 years, it might seem that, for all practical
purposes, they are phenomena that could safely be ignored.1
Such complacency would be a mistake. Although I will argue that these putative
counterexamples need not lead us to reject the transitivity of the better-than
relation, they do concern a common, and quite important, feature of our
evaluative lives. More specifically, they are instances of our practice of taking
certain qualitative differences between options to carry a particular kind of
evaluative significance. The primary goal of this paper is to begin the work of
developing an account of this practice: what it is, what difficulties it engenders,
and how those difficulties might be addressed. The paper begins with an attempt
to both illustrate and clarify the role qualitative distinctions play in some of our
evaluative judgments. I then go on to show that our practice of according them
this role runs into trouble when our options represent borderline cases of
evaluatively significant qualitative distinctions. The bulk of the third section of the
For comments on previous versions of this paper, I am grateful to
Charles Goodman, an anonymous referee for this journal, and, especially, Larry
Temkin.
1 The counterexamples are presented in Temkin (1996) and Rachels
(1998). Rachels is sympathetic to the view that the counterexamples are not of
great practical import: “Abandoning Transitivity has few practical implications.
Because there are few exceptions to the principle, it may persist in our reasoning
as a rule of thumb.” (Rachels (1998), p. 83)
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paper is dedicated to motivating an analysis of the evaluative status of such
options. There I lay the groundwork for saying that such options generate
comparisons in which we can neither assert nor deny that one option is better
than another. The fourth section of the paper shows how this analysis gives us
hope of defusing Temkin’s and Rachels’ argument against the transitivity of the
better-than relation. Finally, I close with a discussion of how the account
developed here might go beyond resolving theoretical puzzles and be of practical
import in situations that confront us in ordinary life.
2. In making practical decisions, we often must make judgments about the
comparative value of our options. Rarely are these judgments based on a single
kind of evaluative consideration. Instead, there are typically several different
evaluative dimensions along which two options must be compared in order to
determine whether one is better or that they are equally good. Take a choice that
is undoubtedly familiar to many of us – that of what kind of life to lead. In order
to determine whether one kind of life is better for us than another, we need to
assess the degree to which each provides opportunities for meaningful
relationships, accomplishment, contentment, health, and many other things that
can make a life good. Or, to use a less egocentric example, take the choice of
which government policies to support. In order to determine whether one policy is
better than another, we need to assess the degree to which each expresses respect
for those it would affect, honors the valid claims that people have, will make the
world a better place, and so on.2 In these cases, and countless others, determining
our options’ comparative value requires not only measuring the options along
each evaluative dimension, but also determining how these several measurements
combine to produce an all-things-considered comparative valuation.
What often makes these latter determinations so hard is that one option will be
better than an alternative in one evaluative dimension, but worse in another. In
these cases, we might say, there are evaluative tradeoffs. Each option “trades”
losses in one kind of value for gains in another, relative to the alternative.
Returning to our examples, a life in which developing one’s creative talents takes a
primary role might involve a tradeoff of contentment for accomplishment when
compared to a life guided by the appreciation of beauty. Or an affirmative-action
policy might trade off the honoring of valid claims for an improvement in equality
when compared to a policy based purely on merit. Where there are such tradeoffs,
determining whether one option is better than, worse than, or equally good as an
alternative thus involves a determination of whether the alternative’s comparative
gains in some evaluative dimensions offset its losses in others.
To complicate matters even further, there are different kinds of tradeoffs. This is
so because there are both “quantitative” and “qualitative” differences in value.
When options differ only quantitatively along an evaluative dimension, one option
In both these examples, the evaluative dimensions I mention all seem to
represent distinct values. This is not always the case: as we shall see shortly, we
sometimes must consider the degree to which our options possess different aspects
of the same value.
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simply has more of the relevant evaluative consideration than an alternative
option; the difference between them is simply a matter of degree. For instance,
one life may include more creativity than another; one policy may produce a
more equal distribution of goods than another. When options differ qualitatively
along an evaluative dimension, on the other hand, there is a difference in kind
between two alternatives with respect to the relevant evaluative consideration. For
instance, one life may be a happy one and another an unhappy one; one policy
may be just while an alternative is unjust.
Although the point is obvious, it is helpful to keep in mind that qualitative
differences in a certain value are also quantitative differences in that value. Some
quantitative differences in value are sufficient to generate qualitative differences in
value, while others are not. If we take the evaluative dimension of contentment as
an example, we can represent this aspect of its structure graphically as:
Unhappy
Unhappy

Happy

Contentment
Fig. 1
Or to put the point of the figure verbally, we say that as the amount of
contentment in a life increases, eventually it possesses enough contentment to
qualify as a happy life.
Our intuitions concerning whether a given tradeoff makes an option better than
an alternative are often sensitive to whether or not a qualitative difference in value
is at stake. Imagine, for instance, three levels of contentment that a life might
possess – A, D, and E – whose relationships could be represented as follows (levels
B and C will be considered shortly):
Unhappy
Unhappy

Happy

A

D

E

Contentment
Fig. 2
That is, a life with contentment-level E contains more contentment than one with
level D; a life with level D contains more contentment than a life with level A; and
a life with level D or E qualifies as a happy life, while a life with level A is an
unhappy one. Now imagine two different levels of accomplishment – say,
producing a body of work that has an impact on one’s field in one’s own time, and
producing a body of work whose impact continues to be felt fifty years after one’s
death. If the sacrifice in contentment that would be necessary to produce the
3

greater of these accomplishments meant leading a life with contentment-level D
rather than level E, many of us can imagine that that this tradeoff could make
one’s life better overall – depending, probably, on how much of a difference in
contentment there is between these two happy lives. Producing such a long-lasting
body of work, we might well think, could be worth leading a less contented, but
still happy, life. If, however, producing the greater of these two accomplishments
meant that one would live a life with contentment-level A rather than one with
level D, many of us might judge that this tradeoff of contentment for
accomplishment must not only fail to make one’s life better, it must make one’s
life worse. For us, being unhappy detracts too much from the overall quality of a
life to be made up for by an additional fifty years of posthumous influence. Let us
call this kind of case one in which the presence of a qualitative difference in one
evaluative dimension constitutes a barrier to improvement by some quantitative
improvement in another dimension – or a “qualitative barrier case,” for short. In
qualitative barrier cases, then, we say that a qualitative tradeoff in one evaluative
dimension for a given improvement in another could not make an option better,
all things considered (indeed, it will make it worse), but a merely quantitative
tradeoff for the given improvement might.3
Intuitive examples of qualitative barrier cases are not hard to come by. Indeed, we
even have an idiom in English for calling attention to their existence. When faced
with the prospect of having to make tradeoffs, we often report our unwillingness to
make tradeoffs that are qualitatively significant by saying, “I draw the line at …”
where we fill in the ellipsis with a qualitatively significant demarcation. To cite just
a few more examples: Many of us might think it is better to support a less than
perfectly meritocratic policy if it produces a more equal distribution of goods than
would a policy that gives everyone precisely what they deserve, but we would
“draw the line” at any policy that departs so far from the demands of desert that it
is unjust. Many of us might think that it is better to be less than straightforward in
order to help a friend avoid a certain embarrassment, but we would “draw the
line” at telling an outright lie. Many of us might think that it is sometimes better to
set aside the less beautiful of two tracts of land as a park if it is more accessible to a
certain number of people, but we would “draw the line” at setting aside an area so
aesthetically inferior that it is ugly. And many of us might think it would be better
to tackle problems that admit of a certain degree of clarity and precision at some
expense of worldly relevance, but we would “draw the line” at working on
problems that were, practically speaking, irrelevant.

Here is a more formal specification of the structure of qualitative barrier
cases. A choice between two options, X and Y, will qualify as a qualitative barrier
case if and only if there are two evaluative dimensions, V1 and V2, such that:
(a) if X were merely quantitatively better than Y with respect to V1 to a
certain degree, and merely quantitatively worse than Y with respect to V2,
then, ceteris paribus, X could be better than Y, all things considered, and
(b) if X were merely quantitatively better than Y with respect to V1 to the
same degree, but qualitatively worse than Y with respect to V2, then,
ceteris paribus, X must be worse than Y, all things considered.
3
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In our original case of trading contentment for accomplishment, there seems to be
a qualitative barrier that makes it impossible for relatively pedestrian
accomplishments to compensate for living an unhappy life. Nonetheless, it may be
that an unhappy life that contains a truly great accomplishment is better than a
happy life that lacks any significant accomplishment whatsoever. The qualitative
barrier blocks a range of tradeoffs of contentment for accomplishment, but not all
such tradeoffs. It seems, however, that there are cases in which the qualitative
barrier is far more robust. Indeed, many believe that there are cases in which
trading off a qualitative difference in one evaluative dimension for gains in
another could not make an option better, no matter how much gain in the other dimension
is made. As one example of such a lexical approach to some qualitative tradeoffs
(and one that figures in the challenge to the transitivity of ‘better than’ I
mentioned earlier), consider what Larry Temkin says about the relationship
between the intensity of pains and their duration:
In essence, I think significant amounts of torture have lexical priority over
any amounts of a hangnail…. My model for this is something like the
following. Torture’s badness might range from 0 to 10, depending on its
duration, with two years of torture being, say, a 7. A hangnail’s badness
might range from 0 to 1. Prolonging a hangnail increases the value of the
decimal places representing its “badness score,” but the fundamental gap
between 1 and 7 is never affected.4
According to Temkin, the qualitative tradeoff of a life marred by a mere hangnail
for one that contains two years of torture could never make a life better, no matter
how much longer the pain of the hangnail lasts. But, as we shall see shortly, it
seems undeniable that the merely quantitative tradeoff of a life with tortuous pain
for a life with a pain that is slightly more tortuous but in which the pain lasts a
much shorter time could make for a better life overall. Thus, whether trading a
life that includes a certain pain for one that includes a more intense but shorter
pain makes one’s life better depends on whether there is a particular qualitative
difference in intensity between the two pains. This sort of case is different from
ordinary qualitative barrier cases we have been discussing, in that there is no
restriction concerning the amount of quantitative improvement in one evaluative
dimension that might be gained in exchange for the qualitative sacrifice in
another: trading a life with a hangnail for a life with two years of torture will
always make a life worse, no matter how long the hangnail would have lasted. Let
us call cases with this structure “lexical qualitative barrier cases.”
The intuitions that generate lexical qualitative barrier cases will be familiar to
moral theorists, for they lie behind certain popular “anti-aggregationist” – or,
more precisely, anti-additive aggregationist – views. According to such views,
there are pairs of kinds of values such that no amount of one kind of value can
outweigh any amount of the other. For instance, this relationship seems to hold
between freedom from extreme pain and mild enjoyments. To borrow an
example from Scanlon:

4

Temkin (1996), p. 191.
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Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room of a
television station. Electrical equipment has fallen on his arm, and we
cannot rescue him without turning off the transmitter for fifteen minutes.
A World Cup match is in progress, watched by many people, and will not
be over for an hour. Jones’ injury will not get worse if we wait, but his
hand has been smashed and he is receiving extremely painful electrical
shocks. Should we rescue him now, or should we wait until the match is
over? Does the right thing to do depend on how many people are
watching – whether it is one million or five million or one hundred
million? It seems to me that we should not wait, no matter how many
viewers there are….5
Here again, it seems that since the pain of severe electrical shocks is qualitatively
different from the pain of missing fifteen minutes of soccer-match-viewing, there is
no number of people such that it would be better to bring it about that they see
the match in its entirety rather than to save a single person from such shocks. But
a merely quantitative tradeoff in the intensity of pain one relieves can be justified
if one is thereby able to relieve more people’s pain: there is some number of
people such that it would be better to save them from extremely painful electrical
shocks rather than to save a single person from slightly more painful electrical
shocks. Thus, the motivating intuition in this case also serves to affirm the
existence of lexical qualitative barrier cases.
Despite the strength of these intuitions, the existence of lexical qualitative barrier
cases is not uncontroversial. Most of the controversy arises from the fact that, in at
least some cases, embracing the existence of a qualitative barrier to trading off a
particular loss in one evaluative dimension for any amount of gain in another
seems to commit one to rejecting the transitivity of the better-than relation.6 And
while it may be plausible to say, for instance, that a several million-year-long life
with a hangnail is better than a similarly lengthy life without a hangnail but with
two years of torture, to some it seems even more plausible to say that if A is better
than B and B is better than C then A must be better than C. However, I will
argue that, properly understood, qualitative barrier cases need not threaten
transitivity. If I am right, then, this central reason for doubting the existence of
such barriers has no force.
3. In both the ordinary and lexical qualitative barrier cases, whether one option is
better than another depends on whether or not there is a qualitative difference at
stake between them. For some pairs of options, however, it is not clear that there
either is or is not a particular qualitative difference at stake between them. This is
Scanlon (2001), p. 235. Although this is a powerful case in support of
anti-aggregationist views concerning the goodness of outcomes, Scanlon does not
use it in this way; instead, he uses it to motivate anti-aggregationist views
concerning the treatment we owe one another. For other expressions of the appeal
of anti-aggregationism, see Griffin (1986), pp. 86-87; Parfit (1987), pp.160-161;
and Temkin (1996), pp. 188-189.
6 See, for instance, Norcross (1997), especially pp. 144-158.
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because the terms we use to mark many qualitative differences are vague. There
seems to be, for instance, no precise minimum amount of contentment that one’s
life must contain if it is to be a happy one. There are borderline cases of happy
lives, just as there are borderline cases of just policies, lying, ugliness, practical
irrelevance, torturous pain, and many other markers of qualitative value
differences. Again using contentment as an example, a more accurate graphical
representation of the structure of these evaluative dimensions would be:
Unhappy

Happy

Contentment
Fig. 4

Now, if we return to our example of trading off contentment for accomplishment,
we can imagine five levels of contentment – A, B, C, D and E – that are related as
follows:

Unhappy

Happy

A

BC

D

E

Contentment
Fig. 4

Lives with contentment-levels B and C are borderline cases of happy lives, and
lives with contentment-level C are just ever so slightly happier than those with
contentment-level B. Earlier, I claimed that trading contentment-level E for D in
order to achieve fifty years of posthumous influence might make for a life that is
better overall, but that trading contentment-level D for level A in exchange for the
greater accomplishment would mean living a worse life. But now what do we say
about trading contentment-level D for level B in exchange for the greater
accomplishment? Or level B for level A? Or, for that matter, level C for level B?
As we shall see shortly, answering these questions will prove important to
resolving both theoretical and practical problems.
We can begin answering these questions by noting that, with respect to the
tradeoffs of D for B and B for A, it seems that we can neither affirm nor deny that
there is the qualitative difference between an amount of contentment sufficient for
a happy life and an amount that is insufficient for a happy one that, intuitively,
plays such an important role in the comparative value of two lives. This is because
we can neither affirm nor deny that a life with contentment-level B is a happy one.
The fact that one of our options is a borderline case of a qualitatively significant
7

demarcation frustrates our being able to say that the relevant qualitative
difference obtains between it and another. Thus, the choice between B and D,
and that between A and B, seem to be borderline cases of a choice in which the
relevant qualitative difference is at stake.7 (That there should be such borderline
cases of there being a particular qualitative difference should come as no surprise
– it is hard to see how ‘qualitative difference’ could be precise when the terms
marking the qualitative difference are vague.)
There is an intuitively appealing argument that supports this intuitively
compelling view. To affirm that the relevant qualitative difference obtains
between, say, contentment-level D and B would be to affirm that a life with level
D is a happy one, while a life with B is not. But we cannot affirm the latter
conjunct: since a life with contentment-level B is a borderline case of a happy life,
we cannot claim that such a life is unhappy. Consequently, we cannot affirm that
the relevant qualitative difference is at stake when one trades contentment-level D
for B. Nor, for similar reasons, can we deny that the relevant qualitative difference
is at stake between D and B. To deny this would be to affirm that it is not the case
that a life with contentment-level D is a happy life, while a life with level B is an
unhappy one. And this is to affirm that either a life with level D is not a happy life
or that a life with level B is not an unhappy one. But we cannot affirm either
disjunct: Because a life with level D is a happy life, we cannot affirm that it is not,
and because a life with level B is a borderline case of a happy life, we cannot say
that is not an unhappy one. So we cannot deny that the relevant qualitative
difference is at stake in the trade of D for B. Thus, since we can neither affirm nor
deny that the relevant qualitative difference is at stake between D and B, we can
conclude that trading D for B in order to gain in some other evaluative dimension
is a borderline case of a tradeoff in which the relevant qualitative difference is at
stake.8

I use the term ‘the relevant qualitative difference’ to refer to the
difference that generates a qualitative barrier in the case under discussion. In the
present context, therefore, it refers to the difference between a happy and an
unhappy life.
8 This is not to say that there is no qualitative difference between
contentment-levels D and B – perhaps borderline happy lives and definitely happy
lives differ in the kind, not just the degree, of contentment they possess. If so, there
is the further question of whether this difference generates a barrier to trading off
contentment for accomplishment. If this difference does not generate such a
barrier, then this qualitative difference is not evaluatively significant – trading a
happy life for a borderline happy life can be treated just like tradeoffs that differ
only in the degree of contentment they contain. If, on the other hand, the
difference between lives that are definitely happy and those that are borderline
happy does generate a barrier to trading off contentment for accomplishment,
then precisely the same points under discussion here will arise again: this time for
borderline cases of borderline happy lives. For the division between borderline
happy lives and definitely happy lives is no sharper than that between happy lives
and unhappy ones: ‘borderline happy’ is, like ‘happy,’ a vague term. For more on
7
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While I do ultimately find this argument persuasive, not all arguments of this form
will be persuasive as well. For the present argument infers from the fact that we
can neither affirm nor deny two disjuncts that we can neither affirm nor deny
their disjunction. But this is not universally the case. It may be, for instance, that I
can neither affirm nor deny that the Riemann Hypothesis is true, and that I can
neither affirm nor deny that it is false. Nonetheless, I can affirm that the theorem
is either true or false.
There is, however, an important difference between the argument I offered above
and the mathematical counterexample to the general argument form. In the
mathematical counterexample, we know that the Riemann Hypothesis is not a
borderline case of a true theorem, for there are no borderline cases of true
theorems. And it is my confidence that this is so that explains why I can affirm
that the theorem is either true or not, despite my not being able to say which. But
the argument concerning whether the relevant qualitative difference is at stake
between contentment-levels D and B cannot be undermined by similar reasoning.
It is precisely because the disjunction ‘Either a life with contentment-level D is not
a happy life or a life with level B is not an unhappy one,’ contains a disjunct that is
a predication of a term to one of its borderline cases that we are led to believe that
we can neither affirm nor deny the disjunction.
Part of the difficulty here is that my characterization of borderline cases of a vague
term as cases in which we can neither affirm nor deny that the term applies is
neutral between several different explanations of why this might be so. This
neutrality has been helpful because, in identifying a central aspect of borderline
cases that is nearly universally granted by philosophical accounts of vagueness, it
allows our discussion to proceed without taking a stand on controversial matters in
semantics. But because the precise structure of a successful argument for the claim
being defended here – viz. that a tradeoff involving a borderline case of an
evaluatively significant qualitative distinction is a borderline case of a tradeoff in
which that qualitative difference is at stake – will depend on how we understand
borderline cases, this neutrality prevents the intuitive version of the argument
from being as clean as one might like.9 So in order to allay any further doubts, let
us go through the three main contenders for the semantics of vague predicates –
supervaluationism, epistemicism and many-valued logics – to assure ourselves that
each of their ways of clarifying the intuitive argument preserves its force.
Let us start with supervaluationism. According to this family of theories, we can
neither affirm nor deny that a term applies to one of its borderline cases because it
is neither true nor false that it applies. This is because our linguistic practices fail
to precisely delimit a vague term’s extension. They do, however, determine a
this phenomenon of higher-order vagueness, see the discussions in Williamson
(1994) and (1999).
9 Here, and throughout, I use “evaluatively significant qualitative
distinction” to refer to qualitative distinctions that generate qualitative barrier
cases.
9

range of “admissible” extensions – precise extensions that are consistent with how
the term is ordinarily used. Sentences containing vague terms are true just in case
they are true according to each of the admissible extensions, false just in case they
are false on all admissible extensions, and indeterminate otherwise. Borderline
cases of a term are cases that are contained in some, but not all admissible
extensions of the term. Consequently, the predication of a vague term to one of its
borderline cases will be true according to some, but not all of the admissible
extensions. Such predications are, therefore, indeterminate.10 Given such an
account, it is not hard to justify the intuitive argument in question. As that
argument suggests, we can neither affirm nor deny that a particular qualitative
difference obtains between a clear case of the relevant qualitative term and a
borderline case of that term. This is because the claim that the difference obtains
is true on some admissible extensions of the term – namely, those that do not
include the borderline case – and false on others – namely, those that do include
the borderline case – and hence is itself indeterminate. Thus, for
supervaluationists, tradeoffs involving a borderline case of a qualitative distinction
– such as the tradeoff of contentment-level D for contentment-level B – are
borderline cases of tradeoffs in which that qualitative difference is at stake.
Epistemicists, on the other hand, deny that any sentence is indeterminate in the
supervaluationist’s sense. This is because epistemicists hold that vague terms do
have precisely specifiable extensions; it is just that we cannot precisely specify
them.11 Borderline cases of vague predicates are cases in which we are
irredeemably ignorant of whether the predicate applies rather than cases in which
there is no fact of the matter about whether the predicate applies. There is, for
instance, a precise minimum amount of contentment that is necessary for leading
a happy life, but, unfortunately, determining what this minimum amount is lies
beyond our ken. Contentment-level B could be at or above this minimum amount
or not. If it is below the minimum, then it is true that trading D for B is to trade a
happy life for an unhappy one and thus to make a trade in which there is
qualitative difference at stake; and if B is at or above the minimum amount, it will
be false that the trade is of this sort. We are not, however, in a position to know
either way, and, consequently, we are likewise ignorant of whether the relevant
qualitative difference is at stake between B and D. And insofar as this kind of
ignorance is exactly the kind of ignorance that is characteristic of borderline cases
of a predicate, the difference between D and B is, for epistemicists, a borderline
case of the relevant qualitative difference obtaining.
And finally, those who support many-valued logics will also agree that the
difference between D and B is a borderline instance of the relevant qualitative
difference being at stake, in yet a third sense of ‘borderline case.’ Predications of a
vague term to borderline cases, according to these theorists, are neither
completely true nor completely false; they are true to a certain degree. Typically,
this is represented by assigning some numerical truth-value to borderline
predications between zero (which is assigned to claims that are completely false)
10
11

See, for instance, Fine (1975).
See, for instance, Williamson (1994), Chapters 7 and 8.
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and one (which is assigned to claims that are completely true). These theorists
then go on to specify how the degree to which a logically complex proposition is
true varies as a function of the degree to which its components are true. For
instance, if we represent the degree to which an atomic sentence ‘p’ is true by the
symbol |p|, standard treatments of “Not-p,” “p and q,” and “p or q” in manyvalued logics are:
~p = 1 – |p|
pÙq =
min{|p|, |q|}
pÚq =
max{|p|, |q|}12
Using a typical many-valued logic, then, one would state the intuitive argument
more precisely as follows: To affirm that the relevant qualitative difference is at
stake between B and D is to affirm that D is a happy life and B is an unhappy one.
This conjunction, however, is only partially true. Since a life with level B is a
borderline case of being a happy life, the claim that a life with level B is unhappy
is only partially true, and a conjunction is only as true as its weakest conjunct.
Similarly reasoning applies to the denial of there being the relevant qualitative
difference between B and D. To deny this is to affirm that either a life with level D
is not a happy life or that a life with level B is not an unhappy one. But this
disjunction is only partially true, for a disjunction can only be as true as its truest
disjunct, and in this case the truest disjunct – namely, B is not an unhappy life – is
only partially true. So the difference between B and D is a borderline case of the
relevant qualitative difference.
As I mentioned before, the conclusion of our original argument, and of all these
precisifications of it, is an intuitively compelling one. What makes it interesting,
though, is that one can argue on the same grounds that, because lives with
contentment-levels C and B are borderlines cases of being happy ones, the choice
between C and B is a borderline case of a choice in which the relevant qualitative
difference is at stake. This is because the argument shows that one of our option’s
being a borderline case of a qualitative distinction is enough to guarantee that any
tradeoff involving that option will be a borderline case of a tradeoff in which that
difference is at stake. And this sufficient condition is clearly satisfied in the tradeoff
between B and C. (Rather than go through the argument and each precisification
again, I will leave it to any doubtful readers to satisfy themselves by substituting
contentment-level C for contentment-level D throughout.)
To be fair, there is an intuition that might make accepting this conclusion less
than comfortable. Some will be troubled by the fact that there is only a slight
difference in the degree of contentment between B and C. This can be troubling
insofar as we might find it implausible that a slight difference in the degree of
contentment that two lives possess could possibly constitute the difference between
a happy life and an unhappy one. For those with this intuition, it will seem that it
must be false to say that the relevant qualitative difference is at stake when one
trades contentment-level C for level B. And if it is false that this qualitative

12

See, for instance, Machina (1976).
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difference is at stake, then this cannot be a borderline instance of that difference
being at stake.
The reliability of this intuition should not be taken for granted, however. For we
may be mistaking its not being the case that we can correctly affirm a claim for its
being the case that we can correctly deny it. That is, we may be confident that,
given their similarity, it would be a mistake to say that trading contentment-level
C for level B is to trade a happy life for an unhappy one, and then go on to
suppose that this warrants our being confident that it does not involve this
qualitatively significant sacrifice. But this is to ignore the possibility that it may be
a mistake to say both that this qualitative difference is at stake and that it is not; it
is to ignore that trading C for B could be a borderline instance of this qualitative
difference being at stake. That many of us overlook this possibility is not hard to
imagine, for, in my experience, the notion of borderline cases of there being a
qualitative difference does not play a significant role in ordinary, pre-theoretic
thought and practice. Consequently, it may be that our intuition that that there is
not a qualitative difference at stake between C and B is a sign, not that many of us
have rejected the idea that the case is a borderline one, but that many of us have
simply neglected to consider this possibility.13
It is also worth noticing that all those philosophers of language who endorse the
accounts of vagueness we just discussed are willing to contradict the intuition in
question. Presumably, this is because they think that paying whatever cost is
involved in rejecting this intuition is well worth the benefits that their general
theories provide – not least of which is the promise of being able to explain how
our predication of vague terms to things to which they determinately apply is
coherent. Insofar as philosophers of value also have an interest in such
predications being coherent, this benefit is a reason for them to put up with the
intuitive discomfort that may arise from denying the intuition as well. But in the
following section, we will see that philosophers of value have an additional
motivation for holding that tradeoffs between borderline cases of evaluatively
significant qualitative distinctions are borderline cases of that qualitative difference
being at stake – namely, that endorsing this thesis is the best way to vindicate the
theoretically fundamental assumption that the ‘better than’ relation is transitive.
4. Our motivation for paying such close attention to the issue of whether there is a
qualitative difference between borderline cases was that this issue plays in an
important role in our comparative evaluations. In both ordinary and lexical
qualitative barrier cases, whether trading a loss in one evaluative dimension for a
This error theory can be enhanced once we have endorsed a particular
theory of vagueness. Supervaluationists will say that we are mistaking there being
no particular instance of a qualitative difference between borderline cases with its
not being the case that there exists some such instance. Epistemicists will say that
we are mistaking our irremediable ignorance with respect to where the threshold
is for there being no such threshold. And degree theorists will say we are mistaking
less-than-full truth for falsity.
13
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quantitative gain in another could yield a better option depends on whether the
loss involves the relevant qualitative difference. If so, then making the tradeoff in
order to realize the quantitative gain in another dimension must yield a worse
result; if the tradeoff involves a merely quantitative loss, on the other hand,
making the trade could make things better. What we have learned so far is that
these two possibilities – that the relevant qualitative difference either is or is not at
stake – are not exhaustive. It could be that a tradeoff in one evaluative dimension
for a quantitative gain in another is a borderline instance of there being an
evaluatively significant qualitative difference at stake. What we need to see now is
what implications this holds for our comparative evaluations in qualitative barrier
cases.
The most straightforward thing to say, and I believe the best thing to say, is that
when a tradeoff in a qualitative barrier case is a borderline instance of the relevant
qualitative difference being at stake, it will also be a borderline instance of tradeoff
that yields a better result. For example, if we can neither affirm nor deny that the
choice between contentment-levels C and B is a choice between a happy life and
an unhappy one, then we should agree that we can neither affirm nor deny that
trading off C for B in exchange for 50 years of posthumous influence makes for a
better life. And again, if we can neither affirm nor deny that a further departure
from the demands of desert will involve trading a just policy for an unjust one,
then we should agree that we can neither affirm nor deny that making this further
departure in exchange for a more equal distribution of goods makes for a better
policy.
Besides being straightforward, this way of understanding such tradeoffs offers us a
way out of an otherwise troubling argument concerning qualitative barrier cases.
The argument has been advanced by both Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels, and
begins by making three plausible claims:
(1) For any unpleasant or “negative” experience, no matter what the intensity
or duration of that experience, it would be better to have that experience
than to have one that was only a little less intense but twice as long.
(2) There is a continuum of unpleasant or “negative” experiences ranging in
intensity, for example, from extreme forms of torture to the mild
discomfort of a hangnail.
(3) A mild discomfort for the duration of one’s life would be preferable to two
years of excruciating torture, no matter the length of one’s life.14
The trouble with these claims is that, together, they imply that the ‘better than’
relation is intransitive – that is, they imply that when one option, A, is better than
another option, B, and B is better than C, it need not be true that A is better than
C. In order to see how the denial of transitivity follows from (1)-(3), consider the
following way of representing claims (1) and (2):
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Temkin (1996), p. 179.
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Hangnail

Intensity
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Fig. 5
Claim (2) insures that the slope of the line representing the range of pain intensity
from excruciating torture down to a hangnail is smooth. And, if true, claim (1)
would insure that for each pair of adjacent pains in the series from A to Y, the
pain that is slightly more intense but half as long is the better pain to experience.15
For example, claim (1) tells us that pain A (i.e., two years of excruciating torture)
would be a better pain to experience than pain B (i.e., four years of slightly less
excruciating torture); and it tells us that pain B would be better to experience than
pain C (i.e. 8 years of torture that is slightly less excruciating than pain B); and so
on down the series of pains until we reach pain Y. Now, if the ‘better than’
relation is transitive, this implies that pain A is a better pain to experience than
pain Y. But pain Y is the pain of a hangnail that is experienced for all of a 32
million-year long life, and claim (3) tells us that 2 years of excruciating torture
must be worse than any such hangnail pain. Thus, in order to maintain claims (1)(3), we must deny the transitivity of the ‘better than’ relation.
To his credit, Temkin does much of the work of directing us to this argument’s
vulnerabilities. To begin, he points out that the argument relies on the fact that
the pain of (a significant amount of) torture and a hangnail are qualitatively
different, while any two adjacent pains in the series from A to Y are only
quantitatively different:
Many people worry that my counterexample [to transitivity] trades on the fact
that the pain of intense torture seems to be of an entirely different kind than the
pain of a hangnail. This observation is, I think, right on target. … The continuum

Temkin (1996) argues that dividing the continuum of pain between
extreme torture and a hangnail into the 25 steps represented by options A through
Y makes the steps small enough to preserve the truth of claim (1). Rachels (1998),
however, suggests that with this number of steps, the difference in duration for
each pair of options from A to Y might have to be 100-fold in order for the more
intense but shorter pain to be better, rather 2-fold, as Temkin’s claim (1) holds.
15
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from intense torture to a hangnail exemplifies the fact that together, a sufficient
number of differences in degree can sometimes amount to a difference in kind.16
Moreover, Temkin suggests that the evaluative judgments of claims (1) and (3) are
best explained by appealing to the fact that a qualitative difference is at stake in
the tradeoff of torture for a hangnail, but only quantitative differences are at stake
in the tradeoffs involved in each adjacent pair of pain in the series from A to Y:
In comparing pains that merely differ in degree, duration plays a significant role.
That is why we think a shorter intense pain might be better than a much longer
less intense pain. But in comparing pains that differ in kind, duration plays a very
different role. In comparison with torture of a significant duration, a hangnail’s
duration basically doesn’t matter.17
To put the point in our terms, trading off a less intense pain for a more intense
pain in order to have a pain that lasts less long can make for a better pain overall
if the tradeoff in intensity is only quantitatively significant; but if the tradeoff
involves the qualitative difference between torture and a hangnail, trading off
intensity for duration could not yield a better pain. That is, the argument
describes a (lexical) qualitative barrier case.
And, finally, Temkin is clear that, as the intensity of pains decreases, there is no
precise point at which the intensity stops being sufficient for qualifying as the same
kind of pain as torture or begins being sufficient to qualify as the same kind of
pain as a hangnail. If there were, the argument against intransitivity would not go
through. For if the qualitative boundary (or boundaries) were precise, then there
would be a pair of adjacent pains in the series from A to Y of which it would be
true that there was the relevant qualitative difference between them, and hence
false that the more intense pain would have to be better than the less intense, but
longer pain.18 Putting all this together, a more accurate representation of the
structure of Temkin’s example is:

Temkin (1996), p. 194. Rachels seconds this characterization of the
counterexamples, claiming that their appeal rests on principles according to which
“some morally relevant differences in degree amount to morally relevant
differences in kind.” Rachels (1998), p. 71.
17 Temkin (1996), p. 194.
18 In response to the objection that if A and Y are different kinds of pain,
then there must be some point along the continuum from A to Y at which the
pain ceases to be the same kind as A, Temkin writes, “The objection assumes that
if two extreme ends of a continuum differ in kind, then there must be some point
along the continuum whose adjacent members also differ in kind. This assumption
is fallacious. From the fact that together a large number of small differences in
degree can amount to a difference in kind, it does not follow that there must be
some point where a small difference in degree itself results in a difference in kind.
Suppose that … there is good reason to treat a 10-year-old sapling … as a
different kind of plant than a month-old seedling. Does that mean that there must
be some point, say, between 36 and 37 months, where the seedling becomes the
sapling? … Surely not.” Temkin (1996), p. 196.
16
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By now, it should be clear how our earlier results bear on the argument for
intransitivity. Since the argument appeals to a qualitative barrier case, we know
that whether trading off intensity for duration yields a better pain depends on
whether an evaluatively significant qualitative difference in intensity is at stake.
We cannot, however, draw a precise boundary between pains that are of the same
kind as excruciating torture and those that are not: There will be pains that are
borderline cases of this kind of pain. In figure 6 above, pains L and M are two
such cases. The argument of §2 established that a pair of borderline cases of an
evaluatively significant kind also constitutes a borderline case of the relevant
qualitative difference being at stake. So we can neither affirm nor deny that the
relevant qualitative difference in intensity is at stake between L and M – or, for
that matter, between any adjacent pair of pains in the series from A to Y that are
borderline cases of the evaluatively significant kind of pain that includes intense
torture but not a hangnail. And, if we follow the suggestion at the beginning of
this section, this would imply that the tradeoff of L for M would be a borderline
case of a tradeoff that yields a better result. That is, we can neither affirm nor
deny that L is better than M. But if we can neither affirm nor deny that L is better
than M, then the transitivity of ‘better than’ will not imply that A is better than Y,
for this implication only follows if the more intense but shorter pain is positively
better in each adjacent pair in the series from A to Y.
We thus avoid being compelled to deny transitivity by recognizing that it would
be a mistake to affirm claim (1).19 That is, we cannot say that is always better to
One might worry that our refusal to affirm or deny claim (1) will do
little to undermine the force of the Temkin’s and Rachels’ challenge if claim (1) is
nevertheless true. But this worry can be set aside, at least provided that any of the
three most influential accounts of vagueness are on the right track. For according
to each, (1) is not true. According to supervaluationists, (1) is false (although each
of its substitution instances is neither true nor false); according to many-valued
logics, (1) will be only partially true, and hence will not strictly entail the denial of
19
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have a slightly more intense pain if it only lasts half as long. There are, instead,
some borderline cases in which we can neither affirm nor deny that this is so.
I should say that, as it stands, this is not a decisive objection to Temkin’s and
Rachels’ argument against transitivity. This is because it assumes that the correct
explanation of Claim 3 is that torture and mild discomfort are different kinds of
pain. In his comments on a previous version of this paper, however, Temkin
suggested a diagnosis of Claim 3 that is different than the one implied by the
quotations above. According to this diagnosis, it is not the fact that torture and
hangnails involve different kinds of pain that blocks the tradeoff of greater
intensity for lesser duration, but that the pains differ so much. It is the size of the
difference that is evaluatively significant, according to this interpretation, not the
difference in kind of pain that differences of great size can generate.20
If this is the right diagnosis of our judgment, then the preceding response to
Temkin’s and Rachels’ arguments does not undermine them. For that response
trades on the fact that in the series of comparisons the argument asks us to make,
we encounter borderline cases of the feature that generates the barrier to trading
off lesser intensity for lesser duration – namely, of the relevant kind of pain that
includes torture. If this new diagnosis is the correct one, however, Temkin’s and
Rachels’ arguments never appeal to comparisons involving borderline cases. For
on this interpretation, the relevant feature is the magnitude of the difference in
intensity, and all the comparisons involve differences in intensity that are definitely
minor or definitely great.
The question, then, is which diagnosis of our judgment that Y is better than A is
correct. This is not an easy question to answer, since it involves disentangling two
things that are present in the comparison of A and Y – both of which have an
intuitive claim to evaluative significance – and determining which is responsible
for making the duration of minor discomfort comparatively irrelevant. In order to
directly undermine the magnitude-of-difference interpretation, we would need to
see that other differences in pain intensity of roughly the same size fail to generate
a barrier to trading off lesser intensity for lesser duration. But it is difficult to find
such a case because it is hard to conceive of any other difference in pain intensity
that is of the same size as the difference in intensity between torture and a
hangnail. Alternatively, we could argue in favor of the difference-in-kind-of-pain
interpretation by specifying the relevant difference, and showing that the size of
the difference that is large enough to span this qualitative distinction does not
generate a barrier to trading off greater intensity for lesser duration when it occurs
(2) or (3) when combined with transitivity of ‘better than; and according to
epistemicists, (1) is false.
20 While this diagnosis of Temkin’s and Rachel’s qualitative barrier cases is
not implausible, the corresponding diagnoses of many of our other examples of
qualitative barrier cases is. In trading contentment for accomplishment, for
instance, we have a special concern about losses in contentment that make us
unhappy that we do not have about losses of a similar size that leave us with a
happy life.
17

at other points along the continuum. That is, we could specify an evaluatively
significant difference in kind of pain that arises, say, in the interval between F and
O in Figure 6, and then show that a similarly sized difference, say, between P and
Y, does not generate a barrier to trading off lesser intensity for lesser duration.
Unfortunately, I cannot yet provide such an argument, and so we are left with a
choice between two competing diagnoses of Claim 3. Still, we have one powerful
reason to favor the difference-in-kind-of pain explanation: it is the explanation
that allows us to preserve our commitment to the transitivity of the better-than
relation. Most of us are far more confident that the better-than relation is
transitive than we are that the correct of explanation of Claim 3 appeals to the
magnitude of the intensity difference between torture and hangnail pain rather
than the fact that they are different kinds of pain. Moreover, the transitivity of the
better-than relation is a fundamental axiom of decision theory and economics; no
diagnosis of claim Claim 3 plays any such theoretical role.21 Thus, we have both
strong intuitive and theoretical reasons to believe that the reason we prefer mild
discomforts of any length to two years of torture is that discomforts and torture
constitute different kinds of pain.
5. It may be tempting to imagine that the structural aspects of qualitative barrier
cases we have discussed so far are of primarily esoteric interest.22 After all, while
facing tradeoffs involving borderline cases of evaluatively significant qualitative
distinctions may not be a rarity, our analysis suggests that whatever choice one
makes in such cases, it is unlikely that one will ever go wrong. Since we can
neither affirm nor deny that making these tradeoffs yields a better result, it seems
that, typically, whether we make them or not is of little consequence. And so even
if we erroneously believe that there is no qualitative difference at stake in such
tradeoffs, and consequently believe that we ought to make them, we will be none
the worse for our confusion. Of course, we should admit that it is not impossible to
suffer from this confusion; if, for instance, one is faced with a sequence of tradeoffs
that is ordered in the way that the options in Temkin’s and Rachels’ arguments
are, one will wind up in trouble if one continues to tradeoff a value that generates
a qualitative barrier. But how likely is it that people ever actually face such a
sequence?
It is far more likely than one might have expected. In at least two common
contexts, we confront sequences of tradeoffs that approximate the
Temkin/Rachels series.23 And in such cases, we often make things worse for
ourselves because we fail to appreciate that we can neither affirm nor deny that
Temkin himself may not find this argument very compelling, for he
believes there are independent grounds for denying transitivity. See Temkin
(1987). See also Kamm (1996), Chapter 12.
22 Joseph Raz expresses such an appraisal when he writes, “I am not
aware of any very significant implications [the indeterminacy of value] has for
practical thought.” Raz (1986), p. 324.
23 In recent work, Temkin has also discussed the practical significance of
his continuum argument. See, for instance, Temkin (2005), §3-5.
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making tradeoffs involving borderline cases of evaluatively significant qualitative
distinctions yields a better result.
One common context in which we come up against a problematic sequence of
possible tradeoffs is when we must decide whether to contribute to a certain kind
of collective good. Collective goods – that is, goods that, if they are available to
one person in a collective, are available to all in the collective – come in several
varieties. Sometimes any contribution to the production of a collective good, no
matter how small, increases the amount of the good produced. For other collective
goods, however, it is only after the total contributions have reached a certain
magnitude that the good will be produced at all. For some of these “step”
collective goods, the amount of contributions required to produce the good is
precise. An example of a precise step good is the passage of a bill in a legislative
assembly – there is a precise number of votes the bill must receive in order to pass.
For other step goods, however, the amount of contributions necessary to produce
the good is vague. An example here is the good of a healthy drinking water supply
– a water supply must be largely, but not completely, free of toxins in order to be
healthy, but there is no precise minimum level of toxicity at which it stops being
unhealthy and begins to qualify as healthy. It is with respect to this latter, quite
common, sub-category of step goods that we ignore the structure of qualitative
barrier cases at our peril.
As has been widely discussed, the cooperative production of collective goods can
be difficult for groups to achieve if each member of the group is free to refrain
from contributing to the good. Even if all members would be better off if they all
contributed to the public good than if none of them contributed, a group may still
fail to produce the good because each individual will hope to profit from the
contributions of others without paying the cost of contributing herself. If each
individual acts on this hope of “free-riding” on the contributions of others, none
will contribute, and the good will never be produced.
Notice that we can interpret the question of whether to contribute to the
production of a collective step good as a question of whether to make a tradeoff in
a qualitative barrier case. In qualitative barrier cases, we say that whether one
should trade losses in one evaluative dimension for gains in another depends on
whether there is an evaluatively significant qualitative difference at stake. In
collective step good contribution decisions, we can similarly say that whether an
individual should pay the cost of contributing to the collective good depends on
whether there is an evaluatively significant qualitative difference at stake – namely
the difference between the good’s being produced and its not being produced. If
an individual’s contribution is not necessary for the good to be produced, the
relevant qualitative difference is not at stake, and she will probably be better off
saving her contribution for herself. But if her contribution is necessary to produce
the good, she will be better off contributing, because failing to contribute will
involve paying the qualitatively significant sacrifice of being unable to enjoy the
collective good at all.

19

The danger is that for vague step goods, individuals often reason as follows.
Whether I should contribute depends on whether the qualitative difference
between the good’s being produced and not being produced is at stake. Since I
cannot (rationally) produce the good myself, whether this is so depends on how
many others contribute. But when I consider each possible number of other
contributors, it is never the case that adding my single contribution makes the
difference between the good’s being produced and not. For there is no precise
minimum number of contributions necessary in order to produce the good. So,
since there is never an evaluatively significant qualitative difference at stake in my
decision of whether to contribute, I am always better off not contributing. Not
contributing is, in the game theorist’s terms, my dominant strategy.24
Were we unable to object to this line of reasoning, it would be very difficult to
show that individuals ever had self-interested reason to contribute to the
production of vague step goods, despite the fact that, as a group, they would all be
better off if they all made a contribution. And indeed, it may well be the
seductiveness of such reasoning that explains why many such collective goods fail
to be generated voluntarily. Fortunately, however, the present analysis allows us to
make the following objection. Since the collective good at issue is vague, there will
be levels of its production that count as borderline cases of the good’s being
produced. When, because of the contributions of others, the production of the
good is at a borderline level, the decision of whether to contribute will not be a
decision in which we can deny that there is an evaluatively significant qualitative
difference at stake, but rather a decision in which we can neither affirm nor deny
that this is so. Consequently, we can neither affirm nor deny that an individual
will be better off if they contribute to the good in such situations. And so it is
simply not the case that the individual will always do better by not contributing to
the production of the collective good no matter how many others contribute.25
To be sure, this does not show that individuals ever have self-interested reason to
contribute to the cooperative production of vague step goods. This sort of result
must await an account of the reasons that exist with respect to decisions of which
we can neither affirm nor deny that they would yield a better result. It is possible
that an account could be developed according to which a self-interested reason to
contribute arises from the fact that, from the individual’s point of view, it is better
if everyone, including the individual, contributes than if none do. But even if this
is not so, it seems unlikely that an account of the reasons that exist in these
borderline cases will have it that the individual has self-interested reason not to
contribute. And in the absence of such reason, it may be easier to make
individuals responsive to non-self-interested reasons – such as those generated by

Pettit (1986) endorses the cogency of this line of reasoning. Theorists
who have suspected it of being fallacious include Hampton (1987) and Tuck
(1987).
25 Or to put the point in game-theoretic terms, non-contribution is not the
dominant strategy for each individual. Thus, vague collective step goods cannot
generate bona fide prisoner’s dilemmas.
24
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considerations of fairness or the common good – that speak in favor of
contributing.
This way of understanding how we may go wrong in certain free-rider cases, and
how the present account provides hope of setting us aright, can also serve as a
model for our treatment of a second practical context in which we stand to gain
from a better appreciation of the structure of qualitative barrier cases. In the sort
of situation I have in mind, we are concerned not with a vague step good that can
only be produced by the cumulative contributions of a collective, but with a vague
step good that can only be produced by the cumulative contributions of a single
agent over time. A good example of such a good is the good of an individual’s
being physically healthy. This is a vague step good because there is an evaluatively
significant qualitative difference between being healthy and not being healthy that
emerges over a vague interval rather than at a precise level of proper physical
functioning. And it is a good that can only be achieved by repeated contributions
by a single agent because, in order to be healthy, the individual must live a
consistently healthy lifestyle, month after month, year after year.
There is a problem with the production of these goods that is roughly analogous
to the problem with the production of vague collective step goods. Consider, for
instance, a person who enjoys the taste of junk food. He realizes that, strictly
speaking, junk food is not good for his health, but like many of us, he thinks that
the very small departure from his current level of physical functioning that, say,
eating a candy bar causes can be outweighed by the sensory pleasure it provides.
All things considered, it seems to him that trading off a miniscule decrease in his
body’s functioning in exchange for this sensory pleasure is better than not doing
so. But, like many of us, he cannot imagine an amount of candy bar pleasure that
it would be worth having if the price he must pay for it was to trade being healthy
for being unhealthy. Presented with the options of being a healthy candy bar
abstainer and an unhealthy candy bar glutton, he would say that the former
would be the undeniably better life. By now, the problem these evaluative
judgments raise should not be hard to spot. At any given moment, if he has the
urge for a candy bar, he will judge that it is better to satisfy it than not, for the
very slight decrease in his physical functioning seems to be worth the sensory
satisfaction he stands to gain. And since it seems that there is no single candy bar
that makes the difference between his being healthy and unhealthy, there is no
point at which it seems to him that this judgment needs to be reversed. Because
the issue is always whether to eat the candy bar and have his body function only
minutely less well than it currently functions, and never whether to eat the candy
bar and be unhealthy rather than healthy, he will continue to judge that it is better
to satisfy his urges, only to wind up a positively unhealthy man.26
This example preserves its force even when we assume that the man can
detect the difference a single candy bar makes to his health: for it is still easy to
imagine that this difference will be so slight that it is more than made up for by the
pleasure of eating the candy bar. This makes the example different from, and less
contentious than, that of the self-torturer presented in Quinn (1990). For Quinn’s
argument relies on the claim that undetected differences are not evaluatively
26
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Once again, it is difficult to explain where this man makes a mistaken evaluative
judgment without having recourse to the notion that, with qualitative barrier
cases, we can face tradeoffs involving borderline cases of evaluatively significant
distinctions, and, as a result, can face tradeoffs regarding which we can neither
affirm nor deny that they will yield a better result. Without this theoretical option,
we would be committed to affirming of any given tradeoff that making it is either
for the better, for the worse, or would yield no evaluative difference. And since it
is very hard to see that the miniscule health effects of eating a single candy bar
could really render doing so for the worse, we would then be committed to saying
that the man makes a series of tradeoffs that are for the better, or at least that yield
no evaluative difference, and yet is worse off for having done so than he would
have been if he made none of the tradeoffs at all. 27 The account offered here,
however, allows us to say that when he is in the borderline region of being
healthy, it would be a mistake to say that his trading off miniscule amounts of his
physical health for sensory pleasure is always for the better. And this opens up the
possibility of providing him with a reason to forgo that pleasure and, as a result, of
saving him from making choices that will, eventually, render him unhealthy.
6. Qualitative barrier cases, then, constitute a theoretically challenging and
practically important component of our evaluative lives. Once we understand
their structure, we will also understand that we sometimes face decisions in which
the best we can do is make a choice that is a borderline case of being for the
better. And since our choices in such cases can lead us into real practical trouble –
especially if we misunderstand their evaluative status – there is a pressing need for
a more widespread appreciation of the risks involved, and, ideally, for an account
of our reasons for choosing that can rationally justify the series of decisions we
need to make in order to avoid making things worse.

significant, and Arntzenius and McCarthy (1997) have given a compelling
argument that that supposition is false.
27 Strictly speaking, it is possible that eating a single candy bar could be for
the worse: if eating a single candy bar were to set off a cascade of biological
effects, and these effects were sufficient to take one from a healthy state into an
unhealthy one, then eating that candy bar would, in effect, involve trading off a
healthy life for merely quantitative gain in pleasure. Note, however, that even
when there is such a precise tipping point in the causal structure underlying a
vague step good, we are typically deeply ignorant of where that tipping point lies.
Consequently, we will be in an epistemic situation that is similar to the one we are
in regarding vague step goods for which there is no underlying causal tipping
point. For more on these points, see Knapp (forthcoming).
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